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Freedom of Information laws are aimed at providing the general 
public right of access to government information, i.e. documents. A 
walk through the offices of senior civil servants at the Privy Council 
Office leaves an unforgettable impression: large combinationlocks on 
the filing cabinets. There are similarly locked filing cabinets in all the 
departments and agencies of government at both the federal and 
provincial levels across Canada. Unlocking these filing cabinets and 
making most of the documents they contain available to the public is 
what freedom of information legislation is all about. "Access to 
documents", "open government", "right to know" are terms closely 
related to freedom of information and are sometimes used 
interchangeably. There is a democratic ring to these broad terms and 
the adoption of freedom of information legislation is generally seen as 
a step fostering democratic practices. This paper examines the tradi- 
tion of secrecy in Canadian government and the increasing pressures 
for open government. 
The case for general access to government documents-with 
relatively few and well defined exceptions-is strong. The 
conventional argument is that access to documents helps provide 
meaningful information about the political process: it enhances the 
notion of responsible government, makes government more 
accountable to the governed, and helps to protect the public against 
government arbitrariness. 
The late Harold Laski observedin A GrammarofPolitics: "A people 
without reliable news, is sooner or later, a people without a basis for 
freedom."' In Canada, Pierre Trudeau, said some years before he 
became a member of parliament and prime minister: "Democratic 
progress requires the ready availability of true and complete 
information. In this way people can objectively evaluate the 
government's policies. To act otherwise is to give way to despotic 
secrecy."' The Conservative party leader, Joseph Clark, before he 
became prime minister for a brief period warned in the House of 
Commons 'There is excessive power concentrated in the hands of 
those who hide public information from the people and Parliament of 
Canada."' In the United States, Richard Nixon, before he became 
president said: "The plea for secrecy could become a cloak for errors, 
misjudgements and other failings of g~vernment . "~  The appreciation 
for the importance of information in the policial sphere is not new. 
One of the classic quotes on the subject comes from JamesMadison(a 
founding father of the United States and fourth president): 
A Popular Government, without popular information, 
or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or 
a Tragedy, or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever 
govern ignorance: and a people who mean to be their own 
Governors, must arm themselves with the power which 
knowledge gives.5 
Open Government and Freedom of Information 
Information has been described as thecurrency of democracy and it 
is argued that the sword of democracy is blunted by the indifferent vote 
who is ignorant about what is going on in his country. The 
conventional argument is that without an informed public, political 
accountability is illusory. In order to play any meaningful role in the 
political process, the voter needs information about political affairs 
and usually turns to the mass media, the professional collectors and 
disseminators of information in society. This wisdom lies behind the 
pressures in democratic societies to follow the long standing example 
of Sweden and more recently in the United States for legal provisions 
(constitutionally enshrined in Sweden) whereby the public and 
consequently interested individuals, the political Opposition, the 
mass media, scholars, business groups and interest groups haveaccess 
to government documents. The legal guarantee for access to 
documents is called freedom of information legislation. 
The very definition of "open" and "closed" government is based on 
the presence or absence of freedom of information legislation in a 
country. In the 'open' system of government, there are legal 
requirements that give the public access to government documents 
and all documents are available on demand except those in limited and 
special categories where disclosure would be contrary to national 
interests (e.g., defence, security or equally compelling reasons). In the 
closed system, all documents are secret except those that the 
government releases at its own discretion because it believes that 
making the information available is in the public interest. 
Secrecy 
There are contradictory pressures for secrecy and openness in 
Canada. Political traditions, federal-provincial politics, bilingualism 
and biculturalism, international considerations, economic interests, a 
strong belief in democratic practices have interacted to bring about 
what Professor Donald Rowat has called "schizophrenic conflict" 
between secrecy and openness: "Among the developed countries of 
the world, Canada seems to rank about midway betweenthose having 
the most administrative secrecy and those enjoying the l e a ~ t . " ~  
The support structure for secrecy comes from constitional factors 
(cabinet and civil service secrecy), the nature of Canadian federalism, 
the practice of elite accommodation in the political process, economic 
considerations and the tradition of individual privacy. 
( i )  Constitutional Factors 
Canada's parliamentary system inherited the traditions of secrecy 
from Britain and in some ways we have made it even more secret. The 
main decision-making centres in Canadian government are the 
cabinet and the civil service and both are surrounded by a cloak of 
secrecy. 
A. Cabinet Secrecy 
At the cabinet level in Canada, secrecy is almost absolute. How the 
decisions at the apex of the governmental system are made and on 
what grounds are closely guarded secrets. The cabinet is the body of 
advisers to the Sovereign and since the Crown's business is 
confidential there is a constitutional reason for secrecy of cabinet 
proceedings.' (The Privy Councillor's Oath taken at theswearingin of 
cabinet ministers stipulates secrecy and it would appear that the 
Official Secrets Ai t  could be applied for a breach of cabinet secrecy.) 
While the roie of the Crown resecrecy is theoretical, there isapractical 
reason for the strictest privacy; full and frank discussions are 
encouraged. The cabinet deliberates the decisions of government and 
there are bound to be opposing views for the very task of cabinet 
making involves bringing in disparate voices. The represenative 
principle-reflecting provincial representation, religion, regional 
economic interest, special interest groups-is deeply embedded in the 
Canadian Cabinet.' The member of the cabinet must be able to talk 
freely and raise considerations that may stem from provincial or  
regional interests or  other factors. Not even successor government 
have access to the records of discussions of the cabinet or  cabinet 
comrn i t t ee~ .~  
The different views of ministers emerge as one voice when cabmet 
arrives at  a policy decision whether it be by concensus or imposed by 
the Prime Minister. The cabinet as a whole takes responsibility forthe 
policy and ministers must give their public support or  resign. This is 
the concept of collective responsibility; aconvention of parliamentary 
government. Collective responsibility would be impossible without 
secrecy. 
Collective responsibility emerged in Britain in the 18th century in 
the power struggle between thepoliticalexecutive(the cabinet)and the 
formal executive (the King).Io The principle behind collective 
responsibility is that the monarch could ill afford to ignore the 
collective strength of the unified cabinet. Today, with the universal 
franchise and the supremacy of Parliament, this reasoning is obsolete. 
Rather than disappkar, collective responsibility blossomed with the 
extension of the franchise, the development of mass parties and rigid 
party lines;ll it remains a powerful tool for maintaining the govern- 
ment in office. The effect of collective responsibility is that ifmembers 
of Parliament withdraw their support from a minister, on an 
important matter, considered one of confidence, they are brining 
down the government and probably precipitating a general election.. 
This usually occurs only when there is a minority government because 
government supporters hardly ever vote against their own party. 
Collective responsibility thus contributes to party discipline, with 
members of the various political parties voting along the lines dictated 
by their leadership. This means-that secrecy, which is an important 
ingredient of the constitutional convention of collective 
responsibility, filters down to the party level and into caucus and 
should therefore be properly identified as political secrecy. 
Political secrecy, in this sense, may be defined as the secrecy that 
serves the interest of the various political parties vying for power. Its 
main purpose is to project for the party a unified image and thus aims 
at hiding evidence of differences over party leadership and policy. 
Furthermore, such secrecy enables opposition parties to  develop 
strategies for parliamentary manoeuvring that might catch the 
government off-guard. It is political interests and not any legal 
restraints that are the basis for political secrecy. Disclosures of 
confidentially happenings in caucus may lead to hard feelings and 
intra-party feuds but it is a secrecy that has no constitional or legal 
- - 
basis. 
B. Secrecy at the Public Service Level 
The matter of secrecy in the decision-making process at the officials 
level, that is, by senior civil servants in the various departments of 
government, stems from the constitutional principle of individual 
ministerial responsibility. This principle-far older than collective 
responsibility-requires that a minister be responsible to parliament 
for all actions and decisions of civil servants in his department. 
Parliamentary praise or  criticism pertaining to a department is 
directed at the minister. Departmental employees act in the minister's 
name and on his responsibility. It is from this inherited principle of 
British governmental system that the practice of civil service 
anonymity has grown up. Students of Canadian politics have shown 
that the involvement of senior civil servants in the policy process in this 
country has been as close and continuous as anywhere in the world.12 
The enormous growth of governmental activity since 1940 has 
brought about a greatly expanded need for decision making at the civil 
service level with a corresponding increase in the power of the 
administrative machinery of government. But the-departments 
continue to speak through the minister only; they are to  a large extent 
out-of-bounds to the public and journalists seeking information. 
There is no right of access to documents in Canada; administrative 
secrecy is the prevailing practice. 
(ii) Federalism 
. , 
Another important factor that contributes to secrecy in Canada is 
the nature of our federal system. Canada has perhaps the most 
decentralized federal system in the world. The former Prime Minister, 
Mr. Clark, described Canada as "a community of communities."The 
provinces have formal constitutional powers of an extensive nature in 
vitally important matters including natural resources, social welfare 
and education. The ten provincial capitals are political powers in their 
own right with such factors as population size, industrialization and 
natural resources important aspects of the power configuration. The 
coordination and  cooperat ion requirements of federalism 
necessitates significant exchanges of information between the two 
levels of government. There is at the same timeastrategic withholding 
of information in the ongoing federal provincial bargaining. The 
practices of secrecy that flow from parliamentary government apply 
to the provincial governments in the same way as to Ottawa. 
In Canada, there are only ten provinces, accounting for a relatively 
limited dilution of provincial power as compared to the United where 
there are 50 states. This.combinedwith decentralization. thesecretive 
nature of governmental systems and other factors brings about a 
situation where federal-provincial relations have some of the 
characteristics of international politics. Diplomacy used in this kind 
of interaction has usually thrived in secrecy; compromises are far more 
feasible before public positions have been defined. Political 
mformation exchanges and bargaining occur at meetings of feder- 
al and provincial ministers, usually behind closed doors. A further 
reflection of the international flavour asDect of Canadian federal- 
sim are the so-called heads-of-government conferences that 
bring together the federal prime minister and the ten provincial 
premiers. The importance of confidentiality in these negotiations has 
long been appreciated by the participants and going public is 
perceived as an obstacle to agreements. Premier Rene Levesque,in his 
first major statement after the defeat of the Sovereignty Association 
referendum, indicated Quebec would take part in constitutional 
negotiations in "good faith" but made it clear that if things didn't go 
the way he wishes he would bring in the press. 
(iii) Elire Accommodatron 
A characteristic of the Canadian political process that finds its base 
in the demands of federalism, regionalism, corporate interests, 
religious and cultural pulls, is "elite accommodation." Professor 
Donald Smiley argues that "elite accommodation in Canada is 
facilitated by the dominance of bureaucratic traditions and relative 
weakness of liberal individ~al ." '~  The interests of the bureaucracy 
are enhanced by the practice of secrecy. 
(iv) Economics 
Canada's economic structure also encourages secrecy. While there 
is a mixed economy with private industry often competing with 
nationally owned corporations (e.g., Air Canada, Canadian National 
Railways), in both the private and public sector the rules of the 
competitive business world are emphasized, i.e., confidentiality. 
Canada has laws that safeguard the secrecy of information collected 
by the government on private industries. The government's 
involvement in business ventures and in providing social services is 
very much respected in Canada and is related to attitudes of trust 
toward the authorities. In Canada's pioneering origins, government 
usually came before society; As Franks has observed: "there were 
tremendous needs for government services in Canada's difficult 
environment, and the origins of the country are so recent for these 
influences still to be p rono~nced . ' ~  
(v) Individual Privacy Tradition 
At the personal level, there is also a support structure the secrecy in 
the strong Canadian tradition of individual privacy. Governments (at 
both the federal and provincial level) have accumulated on computers 
vast amounts of personal information dealing with such matters as 
age, health, education, religion, income, property ownership, taxes, 
legal violations and convictions, customs declarations, among many 
other matters. The widespread use ofthe Social Insurance Numbex, or 
SIN as it is called, gives governments extraordinarily easy access to 
information about our personal lives. There are growing pressures in 
Canada for safeguarding the confidentiality of this information. 
The pressures for secrecy stemming from a variety of sources- 
constitutional factors, federalism, economics and individual 
privacy-are in combination a formidable obstacle to the easy flow of 
communications from the political sector. 
Openness 
The pressures for openness in Canadian society are also extremely 
strong. They include the democratic characteristics, the requirements 
of Canadian unity and the American influence. 
(i) Democratic Characteristics 
Most important is the fact that Canada is a constitutional 
democracy; although this characteristic of theconstitution is nowhere 
written down, nowhere guaranteed. l 6  The governmental institutions 
have fully developed democratic characteristics: 
-The voters judge the government at regular required elections. 
-The government is "responsible" to the peoples' elected 
representatives in Parliament.I6 This "accountability" provisions is 
somewhat tempered by party discipline and in fact Parliament 
rarely defeats cabinets and never impeaches them.17 At the very 
least, government must "answer" to Parliament and the House of 
Commons serves as the continuing electoral battleground. (The 
role of Parliament in the dissemination of information will be 
discussed in detail below.) 
-Parliament is open to the press and public and the proceedings of 
Parliament, as recorded in Hansard, can be freely published in the 
media. The televising of parliamentary proceedings, the electronic 
Hansard as it is called, has further increased public awareness of 
Parliament. 
-The courts are independent, insulated from political interference 
and open. 
-There is freedom of the press in Canada. The International Press 
Institute, Freedom House and other respected institutions that 
concern themselves with civil rights around the world invariably 
rank Canada near the top among the very limited number of 
countries that have press freedoms. It is significant that thereare no 
constitutional guarantees for freedom of the press and freedom of 
speech. 
-The government actively seeks to encourage greater public 
involvement in political decision making in what has been called 
"participatory democracy." This participation requires an  
informed public and the government has a highly developed 
publicity system which directs its attention to the mass media (the 
professional informers) and the public generally. The Government 
has become a large publishing hosue. The Government controls 
what it publishes but the government's legitimacy in a democratic 
society is related in party to the public's trust in the information that 
surfaces. 
(ii) Canadian Unity 
The requirements of Canadian unity also set off pressures for 
openness. Bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada requires that 
both the French and English language populations must be supplied 
with adequate political information that would engender trust in the 
political institutions. This political information is especially pressing 
for French-speaking Canadians who, it may be argued, have in the 
past felt left out from the main-stream of Canadian federal politics and 
thus had difficulties in relatingdirectly to the political institutions that 
are associated with the parliamentary system which they seem to 
perceive as alien to their traditions. Pierre Trudeau, in his article, 
"Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec," argued that in French 
Canada there was an "outward acceptance of the parliamentary game, 
but without inward allegiance to its underlying moral prin~iples."'~ 
There is ample evidence that French Canadians have traditionally 
related to the personalities in power at the federal level of government 
rather than the parliamentary institutions. This emphasis on 
personaltiy politics, with French Canadians sharing the helm, is a 
factor in the strong support of the federal Liberal party in Quebec 
province in national elections. The tradition, Mr. Trudeau observed, 
started with thechoice of Laurieras the leader of the Liberals at the end 
of the 19th century. This development, which came at about the same 
time that there was strong Canadian criticism of the way the 
Conservatives handled the Riel rebellion, brought French Canadians 
en masse into the fold of the Liberal party.19 
For English-speaking Canadians, the parliamentary institutions 
are often taken for granted, though not necessarily understood. These 
institutions are perceived by English-speaking Canadians as part of 
their inherited traditions with which they feel comfortable. This 
situation is changing. Exposure to American mass media (television, 
fi lm, magazines)  means  t h a t  many  C a n a d i a n s  a r e  more  
knowledgeable about American presidentiaVcongressiona1 politics 
than they are with the complexities of the parliamentary/cabinet 
system. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  federal ism requires  g o o d  in te rna l  
communications on a national basis about the federal political process 
to help domesticate the strong fragmenting influences ofregionalism. 
(iii) The American Factor 
The so-called American factor also provides direct pressures for 
openness in Canadian politics. Canada, says Mallory, has been 
nourished by the same stream of constitional ideas, and in many 
respects, the same constitutional atmosphere, as the United States. 
American ways are much admired in Canada and the demonstration 
effect of the openness of the U.S. political process has a significant 
influence on Canadian attitudes towards politics. The freedom of 
information issue was widely debated in the United States as aresult of 
Watergate disclosures which led to the resignation of President Nixon. 
It was partly because of Watergate that Congressin 1974amended the 
U.S. Freedom of Information Act to make it a formidableinstrument 
for public disclosure. The spillover effect of the American example 
combined with ongoing pressurs for 'democratisation' in other 
western societies (e.g., Britain, Australia, France, West Germany)are 
helping to shape Canadian attitudes about openness. 
Parliament and Information 
Administrative secrecy puts governments in a privileged position; 
the means of 'looking good' and explaining policy decisions through 
selective release of documents. Secrecy does not have to bejustified. In 
1968, a New Democratic Party member of Parliament told the Task 
Force on Government Information: "In Canada there isa tendency on 
the part of governments to be partisanin the papers made public. If it's 
good news, the government releases it when it's advantageous, but if 
it's bad news, the government doesn't want it known."20 Nearly a 
decade later, John Turner, after resigning from Parliament following 
service as Justice Minister and Finance Minister in the Trudeau 
cabinet, admitted this practice: "Certainly, in politics there is avested 
interest in presentingany policy or any decisionin themost favourable 
light. This sometimes means selecting facts. It often means managing 
or manipulating information. It often involves orchestrating the 
timing. Full and immediate revelation of all the facts can be 
embarrassing. I know-I've been there.!'21 
Parliament is the great receiver of government information. It is on 
the floor of the House of Commons that the government announcesits 
policies, tables it s legislation and makes available administrative 
documents. The House of Commons-made up of the people's 
representatives-has a special claim for access to government 
documents. The rules and customs of parliament reinforce this claim: 
decisions which the legislative branch of government has a right to 
know must not be made public until Parliament has been informed. 
The government is severly criticized if it by-passes the House and 
reaches out directly to the public via the mass media. The practice of 
'first disclosure' in the House applies to draft legislation, White 
Papers, Green Papers, Royal Commission Reports and Task Force 
Reports, among other documents. The controlled information relase 
procedure, in terms of setting and time frame, contributes to secrecy 
and causes delays. In the last ten years, or so, afurther cause of delay is 
that nothing is talbed in the House until it can be produced in both 
languages and the delays in the translation bureau often hold matters 
up further. 
Ministerial responsibility, party discipline and the rules and 
customs of parliament interact to put the focus of attention on 
government on the floor of the House of Commons; away from the 
real centres of decision making-the cabinet and thecivil service. This 
parliamentary bias promotes the vested interest of government, and 
has a pronounced effect on the political communications flow. The 
privileged position of government, however, is tempered by the 
powers of sanction and investigation of Parliament. 
Parliament's role in the political process is the core of our 
democratic practices. It is important to recognize that in Canada there 
is parliamentary sovereignty and no tradition of popular sovereignty 
as embodied in the American and French revolutions. "The ultimate 
centre of legal power under the Canadian constitution lies not in the 
people," as Mallory notes, "but in the sovereign legislat~re."~*The 
electorate selects a new Parliament at least every five yearsandit is the 
the arithmetic of party politics that determines thegovernment. In this 
sense, Parliament has an elective function by legitimizing the 
government; its own composition determines the government. A 
second function of Parliament is to pass legislation; shape the laws of 
the land. Thirdly,there is theeducativefunctionin that the Opposition 
party is presented an opportunity to state it case to the publicand thus 
the Opposition becomes a viable alternative to the Government. 
Fourthly, Parliament has a watchdog role over the government with 
the purpose of making the government behave. 
The cabinet, while it comes from Parliament (normally, ministers 
are members of the House of Commons)and hasconsiderable control 
over the time of the House, is held accountable by the House. The 
administrative activities of the Government are thus subject to the 
scrutiny of the Commons. The requirements for information 
disclosure in the parliamentary process are considerable. 
.4n ancient rule of conduct of parliament is "grievance before 
supply" requiring grievances to be heard before the government isvo- 
ted money supply for the next year.23 Perhaps the most important 
event in the parliamentary calendar is budget night when the 
government presents its spending plans and its projected incomes. In 
the budget and the review ofthe budget that follows,parliamentarians 
have an opportunity to focus on government activities. Traditionally, 
Canadian governments have limited their budget projections to 
spending and revenues for the coming year. In the fall of 1979, the 
budget brought down by the Conservative Party government of Joe 
Clark for the first time ever present a four year projection that went 
beyond general spending and revenue figures but focused also on 
specific items in some detail. The budget and the accompanying 
research paper set a precedent in government openness that future 
government will find difficult to disregard. 
On money matters, parliamentarians have theadvice ofthe Auditor 
General, an officer of Parliament who has the independent standing of 
a judgeand has special powers ofaccess togovernment documentsand 
financial statements. The Auditor General's Report, which at  times 
has provided devastating examples of poor government judgement in 
money handling, is examined largely by the Public Accounts 
Committee. It is significant that since 1958, Canada has followed the 
British example and the chairman of the Public Accounts Committee 
is a member of the Opposition. 
On language questions, specifically the use of French and English in 
government departments,  there is the Official Language 
Commissioner. An officer of parliament, he has tenure and 
investigatory powers that cut across departments. A more recent 
development of a somewhat similar nature is the appointment of a 
Human Rights Commissioner.  Both the Official Language 
Commissioner and the Human Rights Commissioner report to 
Parliament and are responsible to Parliament. 
Question Period 
The most publicized part of Parliament's business is Question 
Period. The daily, forty-five minute session enables members of the 
House of commons to get information by asking theministerdirectly. 
The oral questions are usually asked without giving previous notice 
and the period is a free-wheeling affair, with tremendous sponteneity 
and vitality.24 (Franks, p.28) In the Question Period, ministers are 
regularly made accountable to the House through their 'obligation' to 
answer questions pertaining to matters that are under the jurisdiction 
of their departments. (A minister can choose not to reply, and sit and 
ignore the question but the political cost of this behaviour is 
tremendous.) The House is filled for Question Period as are the Press 
Gallery and the Visitors Gallery. The oral questions provide the leads 
for many of the political newspaper stories. The television and radio 
coverage of the House of Commons is largely confined to Question 
Period developments. When the Question Period ends, the media 
interest in Parliament declines sharply and there is almost a mass exit 
by the press. The Public Gallery also empties and many of the 
members of Parliament leave the chamber to attend other business. 
Committee 
Government in Canada has become too big for the House of 
Commons to be a meaningful watchdog. While Parliament has 
traditionally been reluctant to dilute its collective powers, the work 
demands have made it necessary to turn over many of the scrutiny 
responsibilities to the Committees of the House. (It is significant that 
the autonomous power of the American Congressional Committees is 
a major factor in disclosures about U.S politics.) In Canada, 
Parliamentary Committees do  not have much autonomy but they 
have been strenthened in recent years togive theman important role in 
the legislative process and perhaps even more significant-in the 
scrutiny of departmental and other agencies of g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~  The 
specialist Standing Committees of the House (e.g. Justice and Legal 
Affairs, External Affairs and National Defence) are largely organized 
around the functions of various departments of government; 
consequently they develop specialization in certain governmental 
activities. The committees have the power to send for papers and 
summon witnesses to testify under oath. In recent year, civil servants 
have been allowed to appear before committees. Furthermore, the 
government has made money available for the publication of 
committee proceedings. Research facilities have been improved. But 
there are also major shortcomings. Firstly, committees are not 
insulated from government control in that committee membership 
reflects party strength in the House. Secondly, that chairmen of the 
committees (except Public Accounts) belong to the ruling party. 
Thirdly, ministers appearing beforecommitteesare not obliged togive 
more detailed answers than they provide in the House Question 
Period. Fourthly, civil servants speak for the minister and there is little 
likelihood that they will contradict views expressed by ministers. On 
balance, it would appear that while the reform of the committee 
system has been important, the potential for scrutiny and control has 
not fully materialized. 
Commission of Inquiry 
When questions raised in parliament are not satisfactorily answered 
and there is suspicion that the government is withholding information 
to avoid embarrassment, there may be demands for a Commission of 
Inquiry. The appointment of such a Commission is usually reserved 
for extremely important matters. The government makes the final 
decision on setting up a Commission of Inquiry, determines its 
mandate and appoints its members. The Commissions have special 
investigatorypowers and whenemployedplay an important rolein the 
disclosure of documents and information. 
Important questions of policy are from time to time examined by 
~ o ~ a l  r om missions and Task Forces in the parliamentary system. 
Since the end of World War Two, Canadian governments have, with 
increasing frequency, produced White Papers. The White Papers are 
statements of basic policy and are preparatory to bringing down 
legislation. They are part of the process of stimulating a national 
debate. More recently, the ~ o v e r h m e n t  has experimented with the 
Green Paper, a broad discussion of a variety of policy approaches 
about which the government has not yet made final decisions. It is 
assumed that the government has an open mind on theissuediscussed 
in the Green Paper (e.g., Freedom of Information) and isinterestedin 
further consultation with the Opposition parties, interest groups, 
experts and the public generally. The White Paper and Green Paper 
experiments could result in wider consultation and participation in 
shaping governmental legislation but the assessments have been 
mixed.26 
Moving beyond the parliamentary process but related to it, is the 
government practice over the past fifteen years to establish advistory 
bodies such as the Economic Council of Canada and the Science 
Council of Canada. The government has created its own critics, says 
Bruce Doern, and these advisory bodies are aimed6'to bring debates in 
their respective domains out of the closed executive-bureaucratic 
deliberations and into a somewhat broader public arena.">' 
In summary, the House of Commons has undergone many reforms; 
especially since 1965. These changes include the introduction of the 
electronic Hansard (televising of parliament), strengthening the 
committee system, and making researchfundsavailable to theparties. 
parties. An important reform was making the Speaker of the House 
more independent from government control. The White and Green 
Papers and more detailed research papers for the budget are examples 
of a n  increased flow of information about government policies. But 
these developments and others have come at  a time of enormous 
increases in governmental activity in Canada. There are doubts that 
the balance between Parliament and  Government has been 
significantly affected.18 
Conclusions and General Observations 
The search for a balance between the people's "right to know" and 
the needs and preferences of government for confidentiality is not 
unique to Canada. Administrative secrecy tends to  be the general rule 
in most democratic societies although the closed governmental 
systems are under increasing pressures to  unlock their filing cabinets. 
The constitutionally enshrined Swedish provisions for freedom of 
information and the quasi-constitutional American freedom of 
information legislation are in a class by themselves; there are final 
appeals to impartial adjudicators (the courts in the United States, the 
Supreme Administrative Tribunal or  the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
in Sweden) in cases where administrative secrecy is challenged. Other 
countries (e.g., Norway and Denmark) have quasi-information laws 
called publicity acts that are not as far reaching in that appeals are to 
administrative bodies of the civil service and not to legal bodies.lY 
Austria, France and the Netherlands adopted access legislation with 
limiting provisions in the 1970s. 
The progress toward freedom of mformation legislation in Canada 
is extremely slow considering the strong declarations of support from 
political leaders, the media, interest groups (including the Canadian 
Bar Association,) and the public. But Canada hasclearly movedin the 
direction of more open government. An important break with the 
tradition of discretionary secrecy was advocated in the 1969 Report of 
the Task Force on Government Information whichdeclaredin its first 
recommendation that Canadians have a right to "full, objective and 
timely information" to  government activities. The Trudeau 
government quickly accepted this recommendation.  Another 
important  development in 1969 was the announcement by 
government of its new 30-year rule whereby most official records 
would be transferred to Public Archives and released to the public 
after 30 years. (There were some exceptions in the 30-year provision 
relating to release of documents that could adversely affect Canada's 
national security and external relations as well as exceptions for 
documents the release of which would violate the rights of privacy of 
individuals.) The archives provisions are of particular importance to 
researchers who now have even earlier access if there is ministerial 
approval. 
The Federal Courts Art of 1970 brought some limitations to - 
Crown privilege and enhanced the power of the courts to compel 
production of government documents needed by litigants or 
defendants except in cases where the minister certifies that disclosure 
could be harmful for matters of national defense, international 
relations, federal-provincial relations or the revealing of a cabinet 
confidence. In 197 1, Parliament passed the Statutory Instruments Act 
which elaborated on governmental requirements in publication of 
regulations and provides for increased parliamentary scrutiny for 
such regulations. The Federal Court Act and the Statutory 
Instruments Act, are complementary in terms of greater 'openness': 
orre enhances legal review procedure, the other strengthens 
Parliament's hands. A further important development was the 1973 
announcement by the government of a new set of guidelines for the 
release of documents to Parliament. The general principle in these 
guidelines was that departments of government should make 
available to Parliament as much information as possible providing 
such in format ion  release d i d  n o t  compromise  effective 
administration, the security of the nation and the right to privacy. 
In 1973, the government took the unusual step ofreferringaprivate 
members bill on freedom of information introduced by Mr. Gerald 
Baldwin to  Parliament's Joint Committee (Senate-House of 
Commons) on Regulations and Other Statutory Instruments. Mr. 
Baldwin had been pressing for such legislation over almost his entire 
22 year career in Parliament (1958-80) but until 1973 his Private 
Members Bill hadalways been allowed to die on the floor of the House. 
The change in the government's policy was disclosed by the President 
of the Privy Council Mitchell Sharp who said "some priority" was 
being given to freedom of information. The Joint Committee set out 
on a wide-ranging study on freedom of information in which it heard 
evidence from ministers, senior officials and experts in governmental 
secrecy, leaks,etc. At the end of 1974 it recommended that Canada 
should have freedom of information legislation. The House of 
Commons approved the Committee Report in February 1976. It took 
another 15 months before the government committed itself on 
freedom of information legislation by issuing a Green Paper: 
Legislation on Public Access to Government Documents. 'O
The Green paper presented alternative approaches to freedom of 
information legislation and thus invited a public debate. There was 
general praise for the 'principle of openness' in the Green paper but 
much criticism of the detailed provisions. There were indications that 
the government would opt for a weak law with broad exemptions for 
documents that would not have to be made public. Professor Murray 
Rankin, in a research study prepared for the Canada Bar Association, 
was especially critical in that the Green Paperwasopposed to the right 
of appeal to the courts. The Green Paper was studied by the Joint 
Committee which reported its recommendations-favouring a strong 
Freedom of Information Act-in June 1978. Among other things, 
the Joint Committee wanted clearly defined exemptions for 
documents that would not have to  be made public and it favoured the 
appointment of a Freedom of Information Commissioner whowould 
investigate disputed cases where a minister o r  department opts for 
continued secrecy. In event the government failed to comply with the 
Information Commissioner's recommendations, an appeal could be 
brought before the courts for final decision." The government, for its 
part, took the position that appeal tocourts was to beavoidedinthat it 
was cumbersome and costly. At the opening of the next session of 
Parliament, the Throne Speech announced that  freedom of 
information legislation would be forthcoming. This did not 
materialize. In the election of May 1979, the Liberal government of 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, which had taken Canada some 
distance along the road of freedom of information legislation, was 
defeated. 
During the brief Conservative administration in 1979, the Clark 
government introduced a far-reaching Freedom of Information Act 
as its first major piece of new legislation. While there were some broad 
exemption provisions, there was no direct reference to  the often 
troublesome "national interest." The legislation provided for final 
appeals to the court following an examination by an Information 
Commissioner. All parties supported the legislation in principle and 
Parliament was expected to  give quick approval. But the 31st 
Parliament ended abruptly with the defeat ofthe government in awant 
of confidence motion on the budget. It is almost certain that Mr. 
Trudeau's Liberal government, elected in February 1980, will be 
introducing its own version of freedom of information legislation in 
the 32nd Parliament. 
It has taken well over ten years to progress from accepting the 
principle that Canadians have a right to  full, objective and timely 
information to government activities, as recommended in the Report 
of the Task Force on Government Information, to reach the drafting 
stage for freedom of information legislation. The beneficial 
expectations may be somewhat inflated considering that a single act 
will have the almost impossible task for declassifying hundreds of 
thousands of separate documents. Governments will certainly 
continue to look after their vested interests and present policies and 
decisions in the most favourable light. Freedom of information 
legislation, however, will make decision-makers aware that the public 
can obtain information to better assess government activities. 
It will, thus, generate new attitudes among officials andgovernment 
leaders; the general rule will be disclosure and openness rather than 
administrative secrecy. Equally important, freedom of information 
legislation will put the onus on the mass media to be more searching 
and investigative in reporting on the affairs of government. Old 
practices in government as well as the media will gradually give way, it 
is hoped, to a more meaningful interaction that will beofbenefit to the 
public. 
Ed. Note - Since this paper waspresented to the Canadian Communication 
Association Conferencein the Spring of1  980. thegovernment has introducedBil1 
C-43, the new, freedom of information legislation. All parties supported the 98- 
page bill in principle and its finalreading was expecredthis Fall. It establishes the 
cifizen's right to information collected at the taxpayer's expense, subject to 
certain exemptions, e.g. papers tha might disturb international relations; 
latioeal defence; federal-provincial relations: security; conjidential Cabinet 
records; pose a threat to a person's safety; material of a personal nature, trade 
. ~ r e t s  andcertain competitive commercial informatin. However, citizens willbe 
able, by paying a small search fee, to ask for information from 25 government 
departments and 100 federal agenciesfor a wide range of information, such as 
opinion survey results, photographs, maps, administrativeguidelines, feasibility 
studies, job descriptions and salary scales. Departments affected by the request 
may intercede and the government may extend a 30-day search period. If i t  takes 
too long, complaints can be made to the information commissioner, a sort of 
ombudsman. Finally, he can appeal to the federal court on the information- 
seeker's behalf: 
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